l located on the Blue Nile River in Ethiopia . Turning then to Ethiopia. Why the Nile could see a 'water war'. casting the DoP as a treaty) has the potential to abrogate the Nile Waters Treaties that Egypt holds so dear. Water Policy, 16(4), 595-608. The three countries have agreed that when the flow of Nile water to the dam falls below 35-40 b.c.m. Because the strategy of land allocation and dam construction relied on senior executive decisions and foreign funding from China, above all, the government was largely freed of pressures of transparency and accountability. Sudan and Egypt, which rely most heavily on the . This agreement could pave the way for a more detailed cooperation framework, and represents a major step toward dispute resolution. Indeed, Sudan had initially opposed the Dam but changed its position in 2012 after consultations with Ethiopia. It can be demand-driven, typically caused by population growth, and supply-driven, typically caused by decreasing amounts of fresh water often resulting from climate change or a result of societal factors such as poverty. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. At that point, the lake that . Egypt accuses. The New Arab (2020b). These conflicts could take the form of international armed conflicts (between states), non-international armed conflicts between a group and a state, or conflicts between non-state groups. A major reason the GERD is so controversial today is that it has not been subjected to thorough safety and impact studies, which could pose a grave threat to downriver nations. the study highlights the importance of weighing up the advantages and disadvantages of counter-hegemonic tactics in general, and of large dam projects in particular, and . A political requirement will be to agree on rules for filling the GERD reservoir and on operating rules for the GERD, especially during periods of drought. It's free to sign up and bid on jobs. Ethiopian Yearbook of International Law 2017. Ethiopia's determination to build a major new dam, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), for hydropower purposes has been the flashpoint of current conflicts in the Eastern Nile Basin (Gebreluel, 2014). Such a mitigation program can make it much easier for Egyptian and Sudanese authorities to cooperate with Ethiopia and the other riparians in creating and adopting an agreement for management of the Nile. It could be a treaty or merely a political declaration as the name implies. More alarmingly, Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak allegedly even considered bombing the Dam. Crucially, however, despite being signed by Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan, the legal status of the DoP was left (deliberately) vague. Swain, A. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) takes an expansionist view towards decolonisation as seen in the Chagos Islands Advisory Opinion, in which it allowed the decolonisation agenda to trump the UKs lack of consent to any contentious proceedings. Workers move iron girders from a crane at the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), near Guba, Ethiopia, on Dec. 26, 2019. Ethiopia, Egypt, Sudan reach 'major common understanding' on dam. [35] These hydraulic mega-projects underscore the ambitious local and regional political aims of the Ethiopian ruling elites. February 14, 2022 JPEG Recently, however, Sudan has been more cautious with the project, citing concerns that the GERDs operation and safety could jeopardise its own dams (The New Arab, 2020b). On 5 July 2021, Ethiopia informed Egypt and Sudan that the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Blue Nile in Ethiopia is undergoing its second filling. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam will have negative impacts not only on Egypt but also on poor communities in Ethiopia as well as on its Nile Basin neighbours Ethiopia's strategy for dam construction goes far beyond developmental goals. per year, that would constitute a drought and, according to Egypt and Sudan, Ethiopia would have to release some of the water in the dams reservoir to deal with the drought. First came the 1999 Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA). However, by far the largest of these projects is the GERD, which was announced in 2010 and work on which was launched in 2011 by means of a nationwide fundraiser in which Ethiopian civil servants were reportedly obliged to volunteer a months salary to invest in GERD bonds. Flashcards. The politicisation of the Niles water and the utilisation of development projects to achieve political ends are not new phenomena. Indeed, Egypt has called the filling of the dam an existential threat, as it fears the dam will negatively impact the countrys water supplies. Since 2015, technical reports on the potential impacts of the dam have failed to reach a consensus within the TNC (Maguid, 2017). It will also give Ethiopia more control . By Ambassador Gurjit Singh*. DISADVANTAGES OF ASWAN DAM the agriculture output of Egypt. On March 4, 1982, Bertha Wilson became the first woman appointed to the Supreme Court of Canada. Sudan is caught between the competing interests of Egypt and Ethiopia. Egypt's 100 million people rely on the Nile for 90% of the country's water needs. The dispute over the GERD is part of a long-standing feud between Egypt and Sudanthe downstream stateson the one hand, and Ethiopia and the upstream riparians on the other over access to the Niles waters, which are considered a lifeline for millions of people living in Egypt and Sudan. The 1902 Treaty did not preclude Ethiopia from undertaking works that might reduce, but not arrest, the flow of waters. Search for jobs related to Disadvantages of the grand ethiopian renaissance dam or hire on the world's largest freelancing marketplace with 20m+ jobs. In 2019, the UNESCO World Heritage Committee warned that the Gibe III Dam had already disrupted the seasonal patterns of Lake Turkana and that this would reduce fish life and harm local communities dependent on the Lake. The multi-services provided by the hydropower development and its technical advantages could be driving forces for local, regional and national development, and a catalyst for sustainable development. Match. The Tripartite National Council (TNC) was then established, consisting of members from each of the three countries with the aim of carrying through the IPoE's recommendations (Attia & Saleh, 2021). Trilateral talks between Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan to finalise an agreement on a cooperation framework for the GERD have been mediated by the African Union, World Bank and United States. (2012). RANE (2015). As a hydroelectric project, the dam is expected to generate 6,000 megawatts of electricity. Cooperation among the three countries has never been more important as demand for water rises, she added, due to factors such as population growth, urbanization and industrialization. The Dam is used to generate electricity and went into partial operation in 2022. Elliot Winter is a lecturer (assistant professor) in international law at Newcastle University in the United Kingdom. Success on this endeavor will only occur under a legally binding regime that ensures mutually beneficial rights. Disputes over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), hailed by both Egypt and Ethiopia as a new chapter in relations between Egypt and Ethiopia based on openness and mutual understanding and cooperation (. . [35] The lack of international financing for projects on the Blue Nile River has persistently been attributed to Egypt's campaign to keep control on the Nile water share. The treaties also purported to give Egypt veto power over upstream projects. It's very unpredictable and it can be very dangerous," says Pottinger. But the project has caused concern. The final touches to these plans were added in 2005 and 2007, and one involves nine hydroelectric dams along the Gebale Dawa to produce some 1,300 MW of electricity for export. The Friends of Lake Turkana, an NGO representing indigenous groups whose livelihoods are dependent on the Lake, filed a suit to halt the construction of the dam. It merely provides at Article III that Ethiopia undertakes not to construct any work across the Blue Nile, Lake Tsana, or the Sobat which would arrest the flow of their waters into the Nile. In other words, Ethiopia only agreed that it would not completely stop the flow of tributaries into the Nile. It is clearly a philosophy that looks beyond the electricity and freshwater needs of local communities to a geo-strategic restructuring of the Horn of Africa. Although Egypt has persistently argued that the 1959 agreement between Egypt and Sudan is the legal framework for the allocation of the waters of the Nile, Ethiopia and other upstream riparian states reject that argument. (2020). The situation seemed to improve in the beginning of 2015 when tripartite negotiations were held in order to determine principles of cooperation. You must have JavaScript enabled to use this form. Second came the 2015 Declaration of Principles (DoP) which concerned the Dam specifically (rather than the Nile more broadly). Both Egypt and Ethiopia could make arguments in support of their positions. The Political Deadlock on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. Yet, Ethiopia is fully aware of Somalias economic dependence on the rivers originating from Ethiopias highlands. It's free to sign up and bid on jobs. Concern has focused in particular on Lake Turkana, which derives 90 per cent of its water from the Omo River on which the Gilgel Gibe III Dam was built. Egypt wants control and guarantees for its share of Nile waters. As a result, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has recognised water security as a possible threat to international peace. In the absence of the application of the Watercourses Convention, various other legal arrangements and political declarations must be considered to gain an understanding of the regulation of the Dam and the Nile River more generally. On March 4, 1909, the Copyright Act of 1909 became law, making infringement of a copyright a federal crime for the first time. Despite several tripartite meetings between November 2013 and January 2014, no agreement was reached on the implementation of the IPoE recommendations and controversies were evolving around the constitution of a trilateral committee. Article IV of the DoP provides that the parties shall utilize their shared water resources in their respective territories in an equitable and reasonable manner and Article III provides that the parties shall take all appropriate measures to prevent the causing of significant harm in utilizing the Blue/Main Nile. Ethiopia can make a strong case that the operation of the Dam complies with each principle. However, the Convention took almost twenty years to enter into force (from 1997 to 2014) due to the lack of necessary ratifications by states. 4. The 6,000-megawatt Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, shown here in May 2016, is scheduled to begin producing electricity in 2017. However, the DoP lacks these key traits, and these omissions suggest that it may simply be a non-binding declaration designed to ease political tensions and to illuminate a way forward. While such dams also come with long-term benefits to local populations, the chief beneficiary will always be the state, which reaps profits from the sale of surplus electricity. 1800m long and 170m high. What are the disadvantages of the Aswan Dam? Addis Ababa expects to sell no less than 4,000 Megawatts (MW) of electricity to its regional partners in the coming decade. (2014). In my opinion, this should be negotiable, to fill the lake over a longer period, and only when the river is sufficiently full. The dispute resolution committee could be made up of the Nile Council of Ministers (Nile-COM), which includes the ministers in charge of water affairs in all member states of the Nile River Basin. The dam will flood 1,680 square kilometers of forest in northwest Ethiopia (an area about four times the size of Cairo), displace approximately 20,000 people in Ethiopia, and create a reservoir that will hold around 70 billion cubic . Although Khartoum initially opposed the construction of the GERD, it has since warmed up to it, citing its potential to improve prospects for domestic development. However, Sudans future water requirements will likely exceed its water quota as defined in the 1959 Agreement. Sign up for news on environment, conflict and cooperation. Therefore, a negotiated position that favours Ethiopia is likely to be reached once it becomes politically palatable enough inside Egypt. Nevertheless, Khartoum continues to fear that the operation of the GERD could threaten the safety of Sudans own dams and make it much more difficult for the government to manage its own development projects. Basically, Ethiopia should cooperate with the other riparian states in developing and adopting an effective drought mitigation protocol, one that includes the possibility that GERD managers may have to release water from the reservoir, when necessary, to mitigate droughts. Ethiopia's Grand Renaissance Dam: Ending Africa's Oldest Geopolitical Rivalry? A regional framework for the management of the Nile already existsthe Nile Basin Initiative mentioned abovewhich is a partnership among the Nile riparian states that was launched in 1999. Although Ethiopia has argued that the hydroelectric GERD will not significantly affect the flow of water into the Nile, Egypt, which depends almost entirely on the Nile waters for household and commercial uses, sees the dam as a major threat to its water security. It signifies that Egypts de facto veto power on major upstream dams has been broken, and it clearly demonstrates the political will of Ethiopia to develop its water infrastructure even in the absence of a comprehensive basin agreement. The Kenyan Lake is heavily dependent on the fresh water and vital nutrients supplied by the rivers annual floods, making it a paradise for fisheries. The GDP per capita in Ethiopia is only $475. Security implications of growing water scarcity in Egypt. The 10-year filling time of GERD will likely contribute to fastened salinisation in Egypt. The Ethiopian government is spending $4.7 billion to construct the 1,780-meter dam across the Blue Nile. A more recent trilateral meeting mediated by the African Union in mid-July, however, appeared to diffuse the situation with all three countries reaching a major common understanding towards achieving an agreement (Al Jazeera, 2020). Al Jazeera (2020). This is an intergovernmental partnership to provide a forum for consultation and coordination for the sustainable management and development of shared water. I agree with the delivery of the newsletter. Still, if the exception was somehow activated, it would mean that Egypt remains entitled to 66% of the Nile River waters and that this figure should be used as the baseline for any future negotiations. Egyptian players abroad: Mostafa Mohamed's Nantes defeated at PSG, Trezeguet.. Italy Serie A results & fixtures (25th matchday), Egypts Prosecution investigates Hoggpool, Six European nations express concern over growing violence in Palestinian territories, Egyptian Premier League fixtures (21st matchday), US official says Biden expected to tighten rules on US investment in China. Construction of the 6,000-megawatt, US $5 billion Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) began . Consequently, it suits Egypts interests in this context to argue that the DoP is binding, that it precludes any net loss of flow and therefore that the use of the Dam for irrigation purposes is prohibited. The strategy and its surrounding narrative have attracted large influxes of foreign investment in the Ethiopian agrarian sector, with multi-million dollar leases of agricultural land to foreigners generally linked to irrigation projects planned in tandem with the construction of the dam. Poverty alleviation, which is a major concern for all Nile Basin countries, could form the basis of a cooperative arrangement between all the Niles riparians. The current filling which is ongoing since early July 2021 has presented no issues as well. Given the advancement of the dam construction - the GERD being, as of March 2015, 40% complete, according to Ethiopia - Egypt had good reason to reconsider its position (RANE, 2015). The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) is a 6000 MW hydropower project on the Blue Nile, which the Ethiopian government plans to build to fulfill the country's energy needs. Water scarcity is a growing problem. khadsyy Plus. Today, however, Ethiopia is building the Grand Renaissance Dam and, with it, Ethiopia will physically control the Blue Nile Gorgethe primary source of most of the Nile waters. l Coordinates 111255N 3505 . Article 7 provides that watercourse states must take all appropriate measures to prevent significant harm to other watercourse States and that, where harm does occur, there shall be consultations to discuss the question of compensation. Finally, Article 8 requires that watercourse states cooperate on the basis of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, mutual benefit and good faith.. Ultimately, all the water is allowed to pass downstream such that there is no net loss of flow (with the exception of water lost to evaporation). The Zenawi concept of a Strong Ethiopia envisions the country as a powerful hydroelectric energy hub exporting electricity to Djibouti and Somalia in the east, Kenya and Uganda to the south, and Sudan to the west. Egypt relies on the river for as much as 90 percent of its freshwater and sees the new dam as an existential . Egypt, Ethiopia to form joint committee on Renaissance Dam. What could have been strictly technical negotiations have turned into a political deadlock. The late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, who laid the foundation stone in 2011, said the dam would be built without begging for money . These discussions highlighted benefits such as more consistent water flow, minimising the risks of flood and drought, and the potential for discounted hydroelectricity produced by the Dam. Subsequent impact studies were performed by the European Investment Bank and the African Development Bank, and in the light of the results, these banks cancelled their funding for Gibe III. Flashcards. The withdrawal from the project by Deltares has been met by a wave of objections in Egypt for fear . Ethiopia needs regional customers for its hydropower to ensure the economic feasibility of the GERD. Both countries are concerned that without a clear and binding agreement with Ethiopia, the latter will have full control of the passage of water from the GERD during droughts, which would be devastating to the lives of millions in Egypt and Sudan. There has long been a conflict over water rights among the riparian countries of the Eastern Nile Basin (Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia). A political requirement will be to agree on rules for filling the GERD reservoir and on operating rules for the GERD, especially during periods of drought. Filling of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) along the Blue Nile River is well under way near the Ethiopia-Sudan border. The largest permanent desert lake in the world, Turkana has three national parks that are now listed as UNESCO World Heritage Sites. Ethiopian general threatens military force to defend Nile dam as negotiations with Egypt falter. This was an attempt at a wholesale replacement for the Nile Waters Treaties. Lastly, over-year storage facilities upstream in Ethiopia will allow Sudan to increase its water use. Perhaps even more consequential is the fact that this agreement granted Egypt veto power over future Nile River projects. This exception was implemented to mitigate the risk of decolonisation leading to boundary wars. Addis Ababa launched the construction of the GERD under Zenawi, and work on it has proceeded at full steam ahead ever since. At this point, though, the GERD is nearly completed, and so Egypt has shifted its position to trying to secure a political agreement over the timetable for filling the GERDs reservoir and how the GERD will be managed, particularly during droughts. Revisiting hydro-hegemony from a benefitsharing perspective: the case of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) is estimated to cost close to 5 billion US dollars, about 7% of the 2016 Ethiopian gross national product. Second, the upstream riparian states must recognize and accept Egypts near total dependence on the waters of the Nile River. According to Article 16, former colonies do not inherit the treaty obligations of their former colonial rulers and instead receive a clean slate. However, Egypt could argue that the territorial treaty exception, under Articles 11 and 12, applies whereby colonial treaty provisions concerning boundaries must survive the impact of succession and bind successor states. It seeks to build an infrastructure for regional water hegemony, positioning it, at the very least, in such a way that it can exchange water for oil. To date, no significant harm has been caused to Egypt or Sudan as a result of the ongoing construction of the GERD. After all, the VCLT allows states to withdraw from or terminate a treaty owing to a fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred and which was not foreseen by the parties (Article 62(1)). In any event, the dispute remains. An argument could be made that some of its provisions have passed into customary international law, however, that would require clear general practice and opinio juris. Perhaps the most obvious argument that Ethiopia may want to make is a rebuttal to Egypts continued reliance on the Nile Water Treaties. In that light, Egypt should minimize trips to Washington, D.C., New York, and Brussels, and instead use its diplomatic resources to improve its relations with the other riparian states. The colonial powers have departed and so to continue to enforce treaties agreed based around their interests would be irrational. It also codified the principles of equitable and reasonable utilisation and no significant harm (essentially importing from the Watercourses Convention). Ethiopia has two major plans for these rivers, which both flow into Somalia, in the form of the Wabe Shebelle and the Genale Dawa power plants. Many historical grievances and distrust remain on the Ethiopian side regarding Egypt (Gebreluel, 2014), with some Ethiopian journalists assessing the 'Declaration of Principles' as being more in favour of Egypt than Ethiopia (Zegabi East Africa News, 2015). Ethiopia has never 'consumed' significant shares of the Nile's water so far, as its previous political and economic fragility in combination with a lack of external financial support, due to persistent Egyptian opposition to projects upstream, prevented it from implementing large-scale projects. Ethiopias Blue Nile Dam is an opportunity for regional collaboration, Developing countries are key to climate action, Self-organizing Nigeria: The antifragile state, Managing the compounding debt and climate crises. General view of the talks on Hidase Dam, built on the Blue Nile River in Ethiopia, between Sudan and Egypt in Khartoum, Sudan on October 04, 2019. The latter, in Article 2(4), allocated acquired rights of 66% of Nile water to Egypt and 22% to Sudan (with the remaining 12% attributed to leakage). No water at all was allocated to Ethiopia. According to this narrative, the Blue Nile, or Abay in Amharic, is a purely Ethiopian river. Nile negotiations break down as Egypt, Sudan accuse Ethiopia of rejecting legally binding agreement. (2014). Sudan, caught between the competing interests of both Egypt and Ethiopia, has been changing its stance on the issue. Improved relations among Egyptians, Ethiopians, and Sudanese can go a long way in enhancing the ability of their leaders to negotiate and adopt agreements that reflect the interests of citizens, especially regarding economic development and poverty alleviation. Match facts: Egypts Ahly v South Africas Mamelodi Sundowns (CAF Champions.. Kevin Harts first Egypt show cancelled 'due to local logistical issues', Match facts: Sudans Al-Hilal v Egypts Ahly (CAF Champions League), Match facts: Egypts Ahly v Cameroons Coton Sport (CAF Champions League), Egyptian Premier League results & scorers (20th matchday), Spain La Liga results & scorers (21st matchday), 13 Egyptian women on Forbes Middle East 100 Most Powerful businesswomen 2023, Egyptian Premier League results & fixtures (18th matchday), English Premier League results & scorers (23rd matchday), Prioritising the best solutions for sustainable development, A new beginning for education and beyond, Prioritizing the UN's Global Development Agenda, US-Africa Leaders Summit: Between expectations and realities. Article 5 requires that watercourse states utilise an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner and creates the duty to cooperate in the protection and development of the watercourse. Alaa al-Zawahiri, a member of the Egyptian National Panel of Experts studying the effects of the Renaissance Dam, believes as much. [18] Afraid that a drought might appear during the filling period, Egypt wants the filling to take place over a much longer period. For more on the background and history of these important relationships, see my book with former AGI Director Mwangi S. Kimenyi, Governing the Nile River Basin: The Search for a New Legal Regime., not be filled without a legally binding agreement, when the flow of Nile water to the dam falls below 35-40 b.c.m. This is because the VCLT allows an older treaty to be rescinded by a new one if the new one concerns the same topic (Article 59). Already, the United States has threatened to withhold development aid to Ethiopia if the conflict is not resolved and an agreement reached. Four of these would potentially be located on the main river and one would eventually evolve into the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). However, an agreement was still far from reach. Link, P.M. et al. 2011. how much does the reservoir contain? Government of the United States of America. Misplaced Opposition to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD): Update. Nevertheless, Egypt must not use sympathy for its water vulnerability as a weapon to frustrate the efforts of the other riparians to secure an agreement that is balanced, fair, and equitable. Thus, as with the Watercourses Convention and the CFA, the DoP does not offer a clear legal resolution to the dispute. Most recently, there have been suggestions that the African Union should resolve the disagreement. The Watercourses Convention aims to regulate the uses, as well as the conservation, of all transboundary waters above and below the surface. Ethiopia, whose highlands supply more than 85 percent of the water that flows into the Nile River, has long argued that it has the right to utilize its natural resources to address widespread poverty and improve the living standards of its people. Ethiopia seems to have the legal upper hand in this dispute. The filling regime and operational methods of GERD will affect Egypt, in particular through its impact on the operation of its Aswan High Dam (AHD) which aims at mitigating the high variability of the Nile River flow. The Nile is not a boundary-delimiting river, hence Ethiopia would almost certainly argue that the exception should not be applied here. These parallel developments appear to be elements of a bigger hydro-political strategy wherein the riparian countries aim to increase their water utilisation to put facts on the ground (and underpin legal claims based on those uses) and increase their bargaining position for renegotiations of volumetric water allocations. (2017). Sima Aldardari. The results indicated that the negative impacts on Egyptian water resources are dominant. One senior advisor to former Ethiopian prime minister Meles Zenawi alluded to it when he said that Ethiopia will supply the electricity, Sudan the food, and Egypt the money. To which we might add, and South Sudan will supply the oil.. Nevertheless, it is important to take stock of the human costs, social problems, and lasting environmental impacts of this strategy which have already drawn considerable criticism and concern. Egypt has also escalated its call to the international community to get involved. The dispute has prompted numerous international interventions, including by Gulf Arab states, which have issued political statements and led mediation efforts.
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